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Specifically, article 85 focuses on the market structure and article 86 focuses on
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION

Competition law is designed to protect trade and commerce from unlawful
restraint.1 The importance of competition law, better known as antitrust law in the United
States,2 has increased in almost every country around the world. As restraints on
competition grow following globalization, the United States is no longer the only country
that has antitrust laws. This presents an international trend that creates and develops
competition law impacting economic activity in different countries. For this reason,
almost every government and business decision-maker in the world considers
competition law a major policy concern.3
The European Community (Hereinafter “Community”) has recognized the
importance of competition law and has tried to protect the process of competition at the
Community level, even though each member state has its own national competition law.
The Community structured main competition rules through articles 85 and 86 of the EC
treaty (Hereinafter “Treaty”) to control undertakings involved in mergers, acquisitions, or
joint ventures. For several decades, these articles have functioned well, but some
fundamental problems such as the difficulty of controlling post-mergers were found.4 In

1

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 94 (6th ed. 1990).

2

“Antitrust law” is the more common term in the Unites States, and “competition law” is a more generic
term and is used outside the United States.
3
4

David J. Gerber, Europe and the Globalization of Antitrust Law, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 15, 15 (1999).

William Elland, The Mergers Control Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, 11(3) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
111, 117 (1990).

2

order to fix these problems, the Merger Regulation5 was created in 1989 and gave the
European Commission (Hereinafter “Commission”) the sole power to control mergers
before they were consummated.
The Merger Regulation sets up the turnover limit of companies involved in
mergers to assess whether the Commission should control them.6 If the mergers are
within the regulation scope, companies should notify the Commission in advance7
through the one-stop-shop principle.8 Using the one-stop-shop principle, companies can
save administrative and legal costs because the principle makes the procedure simple by
requiring only one filing with the Commission, rather than multiple filings with national
authorities.9 While the regulation controls mergers with a Community dimension,
national competition laws and article 85 and 86 also govern those that lack a Community
dimension.10
In spite of the general success of the Merger Regulation, the Commission
proposed amendments to the regulation in order to serve the regulation’s goal: giving the
Community the power to govern mergers that negatively impact competition. As a result

5

Council Regulation 4064/89 Merger Regulation, 1989 O.J. (L395/1) 4.

6

Merger Regulation art. 2.

7

Merger Regulation art. 4.

8

Simon Hirsbrunner, Referral of Mergers in EC Merger Control, 20(7) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 372,
372 (1999).
9

See Christian Ahlborn and Vanessa Turner, Expanding Success? Reform or the E.C. Merger Regulation,
19(4) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 249, 251 (1998).
10

Georgios I. Zekos, The New E.U. Approach to Mergers and Market Integration, 21(1) EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 37, 41 (2000).
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of amendments, the regulation extended its scope to include smaller, but important
concentrations.11
As briefly mentioned above, the Community approach is focused on market
structure and the analysis of dominance, unlike the US approach focusing on efficiency
defenses.12 This paper deals with differences and similarities of different competition
regimes between article 85 and 86 of the Treaty and the Merger Regulation. In addition,
through the comparison of the regulation and its amendments, the typical features of the
EC competition laws will be analyzed.

11
12

Council Regulation 1310/97, amending Merger Regulation 4064/89, 1997 O.J. (L180/1).

See Peter D. Camesasca, The Explicit Efficiency Defence in Merger Control: Does It Make the
Difference, 20(1) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 14, 20 (1999).
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SECTION II
INTERPRETATION OF COMPETITION REGULATIONS

Regarding the terms anti-trust and competition law, the function of both laws is to
protect the process of competition against limitations on its operation.13 The U.S.
antitrust law focuses on efficiency through the prohibition of monopoly, and is enforced
through civil and criminal actions.14 In contrast, EC Merger Regulations approach this
topic from a different perspective.
The Community has economic as well as a social purpose, and the EC
competition laws have been devised to support these goals.15 As shown in article 2 of the
Treaty,16 the Community tries to accomplish those goals through the mechanism of the
EC Common Market (Hereinafter “Common Market”). For this reason, the competition
laws such as articles 85 and 86 and the Merger Regulation should be construed in the
light of the objectives of the Treaty. Interpreted in this manner, EC competition laws
focus on the competitive structure of the market in order to protect the Common

13

Gerber, supra note 3, at 18.

14

Camesasca, supra note 12, at 23.

15

Gerber, supra note 3, at 22.

16

TREATY OF ROME 1957 (EC TREATY) art. 2, (“The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a
common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities
referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and
sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection,
equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of
competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of
the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.”).
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Market.17 The Court of Justice of the European Communities (Hereinafter “Court”) has
held the view that articles 85 and 86 should be interpreted in this context in several cases,
including Continental Can.18
The Commission stated that it would no longer apply articles 85 and 86 to
mergers.19 Nevertheless, the Merger Regulation does not expressly exclude the
applicability of articles 85 and 86 to concentrations. In addition, since the regulation has
adopted the criterion of article 85 to test co-operative joint ventures, both the Merger
Regulation and articles 85 and 86 are somewhat related to each other.20 It is also required
in the amended regulation that the Commission cooperate with national competition
authorities by dividing case loads between them.21 Even though the scope of each EC
competition law is different, these competition regulations are somewhat related to one
another; therefore, these regulations should be read in light of the EC treaty. 22
It is clear that the Commission functions as a central authority to administer
mergers under the regulation, but it is not expressed under the regulation whether the
Commission has the same authority in regard to mergers that are outside the Community,
but impact the Common Market.23 The Court also held that the Commission has
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction to concentrations creating a dominant position
17

Valentine Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice 6 (6th ed. 1997).

18

Continental Can Company Inc. and Europemballage Inc., Case 72/21/EEC, J.O. 1972 L7/25, [1972]
C.M.L.R. D11.
19

See Zekos, supra note 10, at 41.

20

Adrian Brown, Distinguishing between Concentrative and Cooperative Joint Ventures: Is It Getting Any
Easier, 17(4) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 240, 249 (1996).
21

Ahlborn & Turner, supra note 9, at 253.

22

Korah, supra note 17, at 275.
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within the Community.24 In addition, the Commission argues25 that the Merger
Regulation should apply the international jurisdictional principles that were established in
Wood Pulp.26 As long as the competitive structure of the Common Market is restricted,
the Commission can be involved under the regulation by controlling the mergers that
have a negative impact on the Community market.27

23

Gerber, supra note 3, at 25.

24

Ahlström & Others v. Commission, (Wood Pulp) Case C-89, [1988] E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R.
901.
25

Zekos, supra note 10, at 38.

26

Ahlström & Others, Case C-89, [1988] E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901.

27

Joseph P. Griffin, Antitrust Aspects of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions, 19(1) EUR. COMPETITION
L. REV. 12, 16 (1998).
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SECTION III
ARTICLE 8528

1. Introduction
The main competition rules that govern undertakings in both the public and
private sectors have been set up since 1957 by articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.
The rules have continued without amendments in subsequent treaties, such as the Treaty
of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the Treaty of Nice.29
Article 85 prohibits the collusion of undertakings that is not compatible with the
Common Market, and governs agreements between undertakings. Article 85 is enforced
not only by the Commission’s intervention under regulation 17 with prohibition orders
and fines or exemptions, but also through national courts.30
Article 85(1) prohibits a collusion that restricts competition and that threatens the
Common Market.31 Examples of anti-competitive conduct are listed in the article.32 The
cartels made before the Second World War are clearly forbidden because through the
cartel, producers control the price and market by quota.33 The price of goods and
services is higher under the cartel than under free-competition. According to article

28

Articles 85 and 86 of the EC TREATY have been changed to articles 81 and 82 since the TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM.
29

Korah, supra note 17, at 2.

30

See id. at 3.

31

EC TREATY art. 85(1).

32

EC TREATY art. 85(3).

33

Korah, supra note 17, at 41.
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85(2), agreements infringing article 85(1) as a whole shall be void. Article 85(3)
provides for exemption from the prohibition of article 85(1):

Article 85(1) “The following shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market: all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between member states
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the common market, and in
particular those which… ”

The Court and the Commission have not construed article 85 in the way that a
U.S. court or administrative agency would interpret a federal statute. Instead, it has been
construed in much more teleological way. That is, the Court and the Commission
emphasize and give weight to the particular aspect that would play an essential role
within the whole setting of the Treaty, and that part affects other articles to influence their
interpretation within the general scheme of the Treaty. Thus, exact analysis of individual
words and phrases seems to be less important. However, it is still helpful to approach
article 85 by analyzing its scope and meaning in order to have a better understanding of
article 85. Article 85 will be examined by analyzing its general scope and criteria to
determine the violation of the article.
The Commission exercises its power through a number of Directorates-General
(DG).34 Among DGs, DG IV works for the Commission in competition matters, such as
the application and enforcement of article 85 and 86.35

34

D. G. GOYDER, EC COMPETITION LAW 128 (3rd ed. 1998).
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2. Scope of Article 85
Article 85 has decided its scope by specifically excluding something from its
scope rather than by enumerating everything that it covers. Some of the exclusions result
not directly from article 85 in the Treaty, but from some other regulations, such as the
ECSC Treaty, the Common Agricultural Policy, and some regulations for transport, and
some from other provisions in the Treaty such as article 223, 43, and 90. On one hand,
the exclusion from its coverage has been partial or complete exemption for a sector of
competition rules. On the other hand, the exclusion from the scope of article 85 has been
intended to provide an alternative set of competition rules.

(i) According to article 232(1), article 85 will not affect the ECSC Treaty and the
rules for the functioning of the Common Market in coal and steel, which was formed in
articles 65 and 66.36 However, after the ECSC expires in 2002 under its own article 97,
the competition rules including article 85 will likely be applied to those products which
are currently covered by the ECSC.37

(ii) Any product on the list of defense items prepared by the Council under the
article 223(1)(b), may also be excluded from the application of the competition rules.38
Under article 223(1)(b), member states have the right to take necessary measures to
35

Id. at 130.

36

A.M. Van den Bossche, The International Dimension of EC Competition Law: The Case of the Europe
Agreement, 18(1) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 24, 34 (1998).
37

Goyder, supra note 34, at 76.

10

protect their essential security interests connected to the production of or trade in arms,
munitions, and war materials.39 Currently, the Commission tends to decrease the scope
of this exemption.

(iii) The application of the competition rules may be limited to some agricultural
products that the Council determines under the framework of article 43.40 In addition, the
competition rules applying to agriculture are subject to the Common Agricultural Policy,
whose objectives are enumerated in article 39.41

(iv) Because the transport sector including road, rail, inland waterway, sea, and air
transport are indispensable to the Common Market, the competition rules of article 85 are
postponed in application to the whole sector under articles 74 to 84 of the Treaty.42
Regulation 1017/68, established in 1968, has governed transport by road, rail, and inland
waterway.43 As a result of this regulation, article 85 applies only marginally to transport
undertakings under several qualifications,44 rather than to the industry in general.45
38

Celia Hampton, Unofficial Consolidated Text of Council Regulation (EEC) No.4064/89 of 21 December
1989 on the Concentrations between Undertakings with Council Regulation (EC) No. 1310/97 of 30 June
1997, 18(7) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 451, 455 (1997).
39

The only qualification is that “such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in
the Common Market regarding products which were not intended for specifically military purposes.”

40

Korah, supra note 17, at 6-7.

41

Paul Spink, Flying the Flag: State-Funded Advertising Campaigns, 18(6) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
382, 385 (1997).
42

Georgios I. Zekos, The Implementation of E.U. Competition Policy and its Rules in Air and Maritime
Transport, 19(7) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 430, 430 (1998).
43
44

Id. at 430-31.

Articles 3, 4, and 5 provide qualifications. In addition, the Commission may also provide a specific
exemption in case of “a state of crisis” in a transport market.
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Unlike road, rail, inland waterway, sea and air transport was quite different
because these transports were covered in many international treaties and conventions.
Even though the Court recognized that no regulation has been made for sea and air
transport under article 87, the court held that under articles 88 and 89, article 85 should
be applied by the authority of the member states until relevant regulations had been
adopted.46 Adopting a detailed regulation 4056/86 dealing with international maritime
transport, the Council let the Commission apply article 85 to the transport.47 Since the
Council adopted regulations 3975 and 3976/87 dealing with air transport, article 85 also
applies to the transport, but limited only to domestic and international air transport
between Community airports to which the regulations can apply.48
On the contrary, the Merger Regulation can intervene in proposed mergers
involving even international routes to or from non-member states, as long as these
mergers have potentially anti-competitive effects.49 It is essential to extend the scope of
article 85 to such international routes involving non-member states.

(v) The Commission’s interest in banking and financial services has been
increasing since mid-1980s.50 Since 1995, article 85 has been applied to cross-border
credit transfer services.51 Similarly, insurance services are also governed by article 85.52
45

Commission v. UIC, Case C-264/95P, [1997] 5 C.M.L.R. 49.

46

Ministère Public v. Asjes, Cases 209-213/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1425, 3 C.M.L.R. 173.

47

Zekos, supra note 42, at 434 (The member states must apply article of 85 to the transport sector.).

48

Id. at 437.

49

Id. at 433-34.

50

Zuchner v. Bayerische Vereinsbank, Case 172/80, [1981] E.C.R. 2021, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 313.
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While the U.S. gives some exemptions of competition regulations to the insurance
industry, the Commission applies article 85 to insurance services without any exemption
except for the exchange of information between companies.53

(vi) Public undertakings, which are afforded a variety of governmental or quasigovernmental responsibilities, are exempted from the scope of article 85, and are
governed by member states granting special or exclusive rights.54 However, under article
90(1), member states are prohibited from enacting any measures contrary to the Treaty.55
Furthermore, article 90(2) allows the competition rules to govern such undertakings
“entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the
character of a revenue producing monopoly.”56

3. Three Criteria
There are three criteria to determine whether article 85(1) has been breached: (i)
there must be some form of collusion between undertakings; (ii) the collusion must affect
trade between member states; and (iii) the collusion must have an objective or an effect
of restricting competition within the Common Market.

51

Goyder, supra note 34, at 85.

52

R.P. Falkner, European Community Competition Policy and Financial Services: An Overview, 12(3)
EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 113, 119 (1998).
53

Id.

54

Goyder, supra note 34, at 86.

55

EC TREATY art. 90(1).

56

EC TREATY art. 90(1).
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(i) There must be some form of collusion between undertakings.
(1) The Concept of an Undertaking
The definition of the term “undertaking” is essential to the understanding of
article 85(1). The concept of “undertaking” is broad and seems to have the same
meaning in articles 85 and 86.57 From the Mannesman case,58 the concept of an
undertaking can be inferred. An undertaking must be an organization capable of having
legal rights and duties, and of acting in co-operation with other parties.59 The concept of
an undertaking can include private individuals involved in any form of business,
commerce, or profession, partnerships, co-operatives, companies, and performing rights
societies.60 Moreover, such a broad definition of an undertaking can also apply to state
organizations engaged in commerce, nationalized industries operating as separate legal
entities, municipalities, federations, trade associations, and publicly owned undertakings
with special rights granted by the state.61
From these examples of undertakings, it is clear that the objective of making a
profit is not essential.62 The key element is to decide if an undertaking is in the nature of
the activities, rather than the organization.63 It covers any collection of resources used to

57

C. J. COOK AND C. S. KERSE, E.C. MERGER CONTROL, § 2 (2nd ed. 1996).

58

Mannesman v. High Authority, Case 19/61, [1962] E.C.R. 357, 371 (The Court defined an undertaking
as “a single organization of personal, tangible and intangible elements, attached to an autonomous legal
entity and pursuing a given long-term economic aim.”).

59

Id.

60

Peter-Armin Trepte, Competition and the Internal Energy Market, 13(4) Eur. EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
149, 150 (1992).
61

MARK FURSE, COMPETITION LAW OF THE UK & EC 32 (2nd 2000).

62

Id. at 32-33.

63

See SAT v. Eurocontrol, Case C-364/92, [1994] E.C.R. I 43, 5 C.M.L.R. 208.
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carry out economic activities, and embraces a company, a partnership, a sole trader or an
association, whether dealing with its members or not.64
A trust company authorized to police a cartel was held by the Commission to be
an undertaking.65 General cartels, which fix prices and allocate production or sales, have
long been regarded to be anti-competitive and contrary to the public interest because
prices are likely to be higher under the cartels than they would be under free competition.
Under the latter, customers would have bought at a competitive price, and would have
paid at least as much as the costs of production and distribution, but under the former,
they are forced to spend money on other things that they desire less.66 Moreover, cartels
misallocate scarce resources. For those reasons, cartels are thought to be incompatible
with the Common market, as well as inefficient.67
(2) The Concept of Agreements, Decisions, and Concerted Practices
“Collusion” includes agreements,68 decisions, and concerted practices that are
incompatible with the Common Market.69 An agreement can be successful when there is
an objectively sufficient consensus between undertakings as to the bargain to which they
have mutually committed themselves. The parties’ lack of autonomy in their decision for
commercial arrangements may cause forfeiture of their voluntary agreement.70 Both the

64

Korah, supra note 17, at 42.

65

The Community v. Fabbrica Pisana SpA and Others, Case 80/1334/EEC, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 61.

66

Korah, supra note 17, at 9.

67

Id. at 48.

68

The concept of agreement clearly includes a contract, but is broader.

69

Article 85 was drafted to cover these three situations.

70

Asia Motor France (No. 3), Case T-387/94, [1996] E.C.R. II-961, 5 C.M.L.R. 537.
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Court and the Commission have dealt with cases on horizontal and vertical agreements.71
Horizontal agreements are made between undertakings at the same level.72 Vertical
agreements whose relationship is complementary are made at different levels in the
commercial chain.73
A decision by an association is any provision of the rules of either an association
or separate undertakings, or any decision or recommendation made under those rules.74
Concerted practices were designed to cover any kind of co-operative activity between
undertakings which falls short of an actual agreement.75 The Commission often
considers concerted practices as an alternative even when an agreement also exists.76
Concerted practices are also involved in horizontal and vertical levels, like the U.S.
antitrust law.77 While agreements and concerted practices require at least two
undertakings between parties in order to make an agreement or practice, a decision by an
association could involve the association alone.

71

Tom S. Pick, Sub-Contracting Agreements under E.U. Competition Law – Applicability of Article 81
E.C., 23(3) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 154, 154 (2002).
72

Wulf-Henning Roth, European Competition Policy for the Insurance Market, 21(2) EUR. COMPETITION L.
REV. 107, 109-10 (2000).
73

Pick, supra note 71, at 155.

74

See Application of Article 85(1) to Price-Fixing Arrangements in the Insurance Market, 7(4) EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 361, 366 (1986).
75

Barry J. Rodger, Ologopolistic Market Failure: Collective Dominance Versus Complex Monopoly, 16(1)
EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 21, 21 (1995).
76

Floral Düngemitelverkaufs, 80/182/EEC, [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 285.
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(ii) The collusion may affect trade between member states
Agreements, decisions, and concerted practices have a significant meaning under
article 85 if they are capable of affecting trade between member states.78 This phrase was
initially interpreted as to agreements and concerted practices that have an effect merely
within a single member state that are not controlled by article 85.79 In Société La
Technique Minière, the Court interpreted the phrase: “for this requirement to be fulfilled,
it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set
of objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question may have an
influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between member
states.”80
This phrase has been interpreted in light of the need to create a single market in
the context of the competition rules.81 In Consten and Grundig,82 the Court said that “the
concept of an agreement ‘which may affect trade between member states’ is intended to
define, in the law governing cartels, the boundary between the areas respectively covered
by Community law and national law.” However, this interpretation does not draw the

77

Goyder, supra note 34, at 98.

78

George Cumming, Cabour Sa Et Nord Distribution Automobile Sa/Arnor Soco Sarl, 20(1) EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 29, 29 (1999).
79

Korah, supra note 17, at 58-59.

80

Société La Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, Case 56/65, [1966] E.C.R. 235, [1966]
C.M.L.R. 357.
81

Rein Wesseling, The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of E.C. Antitrust law: Unspoken
Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options, 20(8) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 420,
427 (1999).
82

Etablissments Consten SA and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, Case 56 & 58/64, [1966]
E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418.

17

line between Community law and national law. Moreover, in Wilhelm,83 the Court’s
ruling84 limits the scope of Community law. Only to the extent that Community law
conflicts with national law does this condition limit the scope of national law.
Another problematic question was how to exclude from the scope of article 85
many agreements which are considered to have minor importance.85 In Frans Völk, the
Court decided that insignificant agreements are not governed by article 85.86 In assessing
the effect on trade between member states, the Court used a market share as a measure.87
If the effect of agreements on trade between member states and on competition in the
Common Market is negligible, the agreements did not fall under article 85(1) because the
article applies only to the agreements affecting the market position.88
This definition is similar to the Court’s approach in Société La Technique89 and
Consten and Grundig.90 The Commission sought to decide whether agreements fall
under article 85 in a quantitative way such as a market share and an aggregate annual
turnover.91 The Commission decided the maximum market share and turnover limit
through Notices, and have continued to control agreements that fall under the scope of
83
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article 85.92 However, the Commission attempted to reduce the number of agreements
falling within its jurisdiction by setting no maximum turnover.93 The Commission’s limit
of its jurisdiction to insignificant agreements results from its lack of resources to govern
them, and from the consequent request of member states which need to deal with a higher
proportion of less important agreements.94 The definition of “the collusion may affect
trade between member states” has been developed, and includes many cases based on
trade associations within a single member state.
Finally, “trade” is a very broad concept that covers all economic activities relating
to goods or services.95 It includes not only the general industrial and commercial activity,
such as manufacture and distribution, but also commercial services, such as banking,
insurance, and financial services.96 Trade extends also to the right of establishment and
the free movement of the suppliers.97 It can also apply to the free movement of other
activities with a commercial nature such as capital, cultural activities, or television
programs.98 This application is not limited to the member states, but extends to other
countries outside the Common Market as long as they have an economic relationship
under some treaty or agreement. It is easy to satisfy the condition requiring that trade
91
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between member states be affected because even an agreement limited to activities in a
single member state may violate article 85(1).99
In recent decades, the Court has placed less importance on the condition that trade
between member states must be affected.100 The condition in article 85 is also similar to
the construction of the term “may affect trade between member states” in article 86.
Moreover, the Court said that the condition should be applied in light of article 2 and 3(g)
of the Treaty in Commercial Solvents.101

(iii) The collusion must have an objective or an effect of restricting competition within
the Common Market
To infringe article 85(1), arrangements must have a negative effect on
competition “as their object or effect.”102 However, appraising whether an agreement has
the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition as its object or effect is very
difficult because almost all the product and service markets within the Community are
imperfectly competitive.103 In addition, the interpretation of “the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the common market” is also problematic. While too
strict a definition might include almost all the product and service market, too flexible a
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definition would limit the scope of the competition rules, causing exclusion of a
substantial number of cases having a negative effect on competition in the Common
Market.104
To answer this question, it is necessary to identify whether article 85(1) is
primarily designed to assert jurisdiction, or to provide an assessment of the justifiability
of an individual agreement.105 Even though the Court has taken the view that article
85(1) is a jurisdictional clause, there are also many indications in its decision that
describe the limitation of the scope of article 85, which is described as “the rule of
reason.”106
The initial interpretation of “the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition” was strict, but in recent years has been more flexible. In the normal
business environment, any businessman seeking to enter a specific geographic and
product market will have complete freedom of choice as to the territories without
agreements or concerted practices.107 However, if some agreement between other
undertakings limits his freedom of choice, the restraint of trade by the agreements already
in the market is directly responsible for the reduction in the freedom of his business.
Article 85(1) is designed to eliminate such agreements.
To decide whether an agreement has an object or an effect of restricting
competition, the Court must first look at the object or purpose of the agreement by
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reference to its express provisions, considered in its economic context.108 The agreement
must either be intended to have such a result on competition, or actually have such a
result, regardless of the parties’ intentions.109 In Consten and Gundig,110 the Court ruled
that if the object is to restrict competition in an agreement, it is not necessary to examine
its effects. However, to appraise whether an agreement has “an effect” of restricting
competition, the Commission should conduct a careful market analysis of the effect on
the patterns of trade.111

4. Exemptions
Not every agreement restricting competition is prohibited as an object of article
85(1). Some category of agreements may have beneficial effects on the Community and
be exempted by the Commission. Article 85(3)112 provides for a list of exemptions for
any agreements or category of agreements that are inapplicable for the prohibition of
article 85(1).
Whereas the prohibition under article 85(1) can be applied by national authorities
and national courts as well as by the Commission, the power to grant exemptions for
notified agreements under article 85(3) is given only to the Commission.113 While the
former sets out the prohibition, the latter limits its application. These exemptions can be
108
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given not by the Court asked to enforce an agreement, but only by the Commission under
regulation 17.114 Exemption can be done either to individual agreements or to groups.115
Block exemptions, which have been known as group exemptions, are of more
practical importance in most cases than individual exemptions.116 Block exemptions,
which the Council and the Commission have promulgated under the legislative
provisions, apply to particular categories of agreements rather than individual
agreements.117 Most block exemptions primarily deal with vertical agreements,118 and a
few relate to horizontal agreements.119
Generally, block exemptions define a kind of agreement that can be within the
exemption.120 To define it: block exemptions provide for permissible clauses in a “White
List,”121 and for the conditions preventing the application of the exemption in a “Black
List.”122 Some block exemptions also include an “opposition” clause.123 This means that
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disputed agreements limiting competition which are not on the “White List” nor on the
“Black List” may be exempted.124 However, the Commission may also oppose the
inclusion of the agreement within six months.125
Block exemptions which are designed to deal with an agreement under article 85,
cannot be used to exempt an agreement made by a dominant firm from infringing article
86.126 Generally, all block exemptions are subject to some general condition that relates
to the free movement of goods and to the sustenance of competition of those goods
protected by the exemption.127 In addition, block exemptions are only valid for a given
period—normally for 10 years or at most 15 years.128 That is, the review of the
exemptions based on the experience of its operation is always required at the expiration
of the time period.129
Finally, unlike the flexible interpretation of article 85, the Court has interpreted
block exemptions very strictly.130 As a result, block exemptions would be inapplicable if
a particular agreement included a single clause restricting competition of any party, even
if the clause is not in both the “White List” and “Black List.”
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5. Nullity
Article 85(2)131 provides that agreements that infringe on the article are void.
Article 85(2) applies only if the agreement infringes on article 85 as a whole.132 The
legal effect of article 85(2) should be applied in conjunction with the provisions of
regulation 17, which enables the Commission to give retroactive exemption from article
85(1) where appropriate notification of the agreement has been made.133 In all other
cases, article 85(2) is construed to say that any agreements infringing on article 85(1)
should be treated invalid within the Community.134
Generally, the validity of agreements including restrictions in this category are
judged by national courts.135 However, national courts will not be able to order parties to
complete their contracts if the provisions in question infringe article 85(1), even though
the Court held in Société La Technique Minière136 that article 85(2) which nullifies
infringed agreements applies only to the agreements having the prohibited object or
effect.137 The consequences of this decision are that it may produce a Euro-defense that
sections of an exclusive agreement that infringe article 85(1) are therefore nullified.138
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SECTION IV
ARTICLE 86

While article 85 governs the collusion of undertakings, article 86 forbids the
abusive exploitation of a dominant position, and controls the conduct of the firm. In
some cases, the conduct of the firm may infringe both articles.139 Articles 86 is also
enforced not only by the Commission’s intervention under regulation 17 with prohibition
orders and fines or exemptions, but also through national courts.140
Article 86 is not expressed to prohibit non-competitive structures, or conduct that
leads to the existence or acquisition of market power. It is expressed to restrain the
conduct of a dominant firm that harms those with whom it deals.141 However, the Court
has interpreted the notion of abuse widely to include some kinds of conduct of an already
dominant firm that extends or consolidates its market power by restricting the remaining
competition, even minimally.142 Hence, conduct that adversely affects the structure of
the market may be forbidden by article 86.143 Article 86 provides a list of categories that
is applicable for prohibition by article 86.144
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1. Dominant position
(i) The Concept of Dominance
The term “dominance” is a position of power for an undertaking in relation to a
specific product market, and within a relevant geographical market, and is used in a
commercial context.145 Since the term “dominance” may vary depending on the market
and the industry, it is hard in the legal perspective, to determine how dominant a firm
is.146 Both the Commission and Court failed to make a clear decision based on a legal
view.147
In Continental Can,148 the Commission defined the concept of a dominant position
in much the same way as economists. The Commission paid attention to the
discretionary power that the monopolist uses in order to set its prices, as well as other
market decisions, without restriction by competitive pressures.149 The definition in the
case focuses on the need for capital and technology. This definition of the Commission
was approved by the Advocate General and was accepted by the Court.150
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The Commission and the Court developed a legal concept of a dominant position
that is quite different from the economists’ concept of power over price.151 The Court has
defined a dominant position as “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the
relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently
of its competitors, customers and ultimately of consumers” in United Brands.152 That is,
if a company prevents competitors or customers from doing regular transactions based on
effective competition, the company is dominant in a market even though it has no power
over price.153
The Court had a different definition of dominance than the Commission in the
Vitamins case.154 While the Commission relied on the size of the company and the
volume of turnover to decide dominance, the Court did not accept that the size and
turnover alone could establish dominance, and instead relied heavily on the market
share.155 The concept of dominance can be applied to not only large-scale markets, but
also narrow markets, where an undertaking controls the market in a strong position,
which substantially reduces competition.156
Any undertaking which holds an exclusive legal right for the performance of a
statutory duty, delegated by a state or public authority, must not abuse its powers given
151
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so as to enhance its other objectives.157 Otherwise, the Court would hold that national
legislation giving a monopoly places a business in a position of dominance as in Hilti.158
To assess whether a firm is dominant, the Commission needs to analyze the firm’s
market power in two aspects: defining the relevant market,159 and assessing the firm’s
dominance therein.160

(ii) The Definitions of Relevant Geographic and Product Markets
Market share percentage can be changed depending on the size of the market.
Market share percentage has no meaning without defining the market itself. The
undertakings benefit from defining a relatively wide area as a market because their
individual market shares are reduced. Initially, based on article 86,161 the geographic
market was assumed to be no smaller than an individual member state.162 However, in
Sugar Unie,163 the Court and the Commission agreed that a substantial region of a
member state could also be a market given a sufficient volume of sales. Nevertheless, the
Commission has a view that the fact that undertakings arrange their distribution on a
156
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national basis implies that they regard such national territory as a separate market.164 The
Court has found that the geographic market is defined more broadly, and the Court
considers beyond the geographic market in the context.165
It is very hard to define product markets because of the difficulty of exact analysis
regarding the interrelationship of quality, price, and availability.166 Sometimes, product
markets might be defined based on cross-elasticity of demand between substitutes.167
The Court and the Commission agree that the product market could be defined in terms
of year-round availability, price, suitability for particular types, and other
characteristics.168 The Court also found that as long as it applied more than one end use,
a simple product could be regarded to belong to separate product markets.169 Recently,
the Court found a dominant position in the second market in conjunction with its close
relationship with a primary market.170 However, this ruling is dangerously wide because
this doctrine can be used to support a finding of dominance in secondary markets where
the company had relatively little market power.171
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Finally, unlike in merger cases, where the focus is on the future consequences of
the concentration, in article 86 cases, the Commission focuses on the past conduct of the
particular undertakings and concerns what the way that market has worked over the
period.172 Nevertheless, the same basis on both geographical and product markets will be
applied in both merger and article 86 cases because the main goal of both competition
rules is to define and limit the abusive conduct with a concept of dominance.173

2. “Abuse” or “Abusive Exploitation”
The purpose of Article 86 is to prohibit, not the undertaking of a dominant
position, but only its abusive exploitation even though the English text of the Treaty uses
only one single term, “abuse.”174 In Vitamins,175 the Court said that abuse is an objective
concept. However, article 86 does not contain a comprehensive definition of either
“abuse” or “abusive exploitation.”176 The concept of “abusive exploitation” forbids the
exploitation of market power to harm customers and suppliers, as well as the conduct of a
dominant firm that reduces competition. 177
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The definition of abuse varies depending on a variety of cases to many different
practices.178 Many of the particular abuses reflect the case law, and include refusal to
provide access to competitors, withdrawal of existing access, exclusionary practices,
excessive or predatory pricing, and discrimination.

(i) Refusal to Provide Access to Competitors
In the normal business situation where one big company having a world
monopoly has supplied a product to one small company, if the big company suddenly
raises its price for the purpose of eventually refusing to supply, it is considered to have
used its dominant position in the market. Under these circumstances, the Court and the
Commission would find that the big company restricts competition in the market for the
product, even if the company claims the excuse of the commercial reason.179
The Court held that any undertaking that abuses its dominant position within a
substantial part of the Common Market for the purpose of eliminating a competitor is in
breach of article 86.180 As long as the elimination of the competitor would have effects
on the competitive structure of relevant market within the Community, it does not matter
whether the conduct of the dominant company relates to its export or to trade within the
Common Market.181 Since United Brands, 182 many cases have been concerned with
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monopolists which increase their market share because the unfair abuses are less likely to
affect the structure of the market unfavorably.183

(ii) Excessive or Predatory Pricing
Regarding incompatibility with the Common market in article 86, the Court
focused on prohibiting conduct that substantially restricts competition in Continental
Can.184 As in Continental Can,185 the Court refused to accept the economic analysis to
decide restriction of competition on the ground that the economic analysis lacked the
depth and adequacy to verify the claim. Nevertheless, the Court agreed that article 86
could apply when the dominant undertaking directly or indirectly applied unfair prices to
its customer.186 When prices of a product are not reasonably related to the economic
value of the product supplied, the Court decides that prices are excessive. Article 86 is
breached if the consumer suffers as the result of such excessive prices, regardless if there
is no effect on condition.187 The Court indicated that whether an individual price is
excessive should be based on a cost analysis and a comparison of competitors’ price.188
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Article 86 is also applied to a dominant undertaking’s predatory pricing, which is
below its production costs for a purpose of eliminating competitors.189 The Commission
focuses on the objective of a dominant company to intend to eliminate or damage its
competitors in the relevant markets, rather than prescribing any specific pricing rules
linked to costs.190 The Court stated that it is not necessary for the Commission to prove
that the dominant company will actually succeed in subsequently raising its prices
following the elimination or weakening of its competitors.191

(iii) Discount and Rebates
The Court is also concerned with discount and rebates which dominant companies
use to restrict competition.192 Both discount and rebate have the same commercial
purposes: to encourage the customer to do business with the seller, rather than with its
competitors.193 However, rebates can be used by a dominant company so as to make it
difficult for customers without substantial countervailing market power to switch
purchases between suppliers, to take advantage either of price fluctuations, or other
changes in market conditions, or because some of the products of other suppliers are
considered to be of better quality or suitability.194
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Pressure thus applied by a dominant undertaking to its purchasers to obtain all or
most of their requirements from itself is an abuse, whether or not accompanied by a
rebate payable to the customer, so long as the customer remains loyal to all its
requirements.195 The Court held that the application of such pressure is itself
incompatible with the normal working of competition, since it has the effect that orders
are placed not because the buyer has made a simple commercial choice in its own
interests, but because the buyer, given his dependence on the dominant supplier, simply
cannot afford to spread his orders over a variety of suppliers and thus risk losing the
rebate offered by the dominant company.196
The Commission had ruled that, for the use of rebates to be acceptable as normal
commercial practice for the purpose of article 86, they must be both clearly known to the
purchaser and defined on an objective basis.197

(iv) Access to Essential Facilities
When an undertaking, which controls a facility or an infrastructure, deliberately
makes it difficult for competitors to share it, abuse can be established.198 Alternatively,
the abuse may involve allowing access only on such unfavorable and discriminatory
terms that it places new or existing competitors at a competitive disadvantage so that they
cannot compete effectively.199 The facility may include a harbor, an airport, a
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telecommunication network, or an electronic system.200 In B & I Line,201 the
Commission ruled that because a port was a substantial part of the Common Market and
the owner of the port had a dominant position, the owner of the facility must not change
its schedules to put its users at a disadvantage.
In addition, the Commission stated that any dominant company providing an
essential facility to competitors which abuses that facility, and refuses access without
objective justification,202 or grants access only on terms favorable to those which it
provides its own services, breaches article 86.203 The competitor seeking access clearly
has to behave reasonably and not ask for what is demonstrably impossible or out of
proportions to the needs of other users.204

3. Limits
The Court’s focus fits well with the spirit of the Community in light of the basic
principle shown in the Treaty.205 Also, anti-competitive conducts can be performed only
by the firm that already enjoys a dominant position in the Common Market.206 However,
it is hard to apply article 86 to firms in the real world. Since the Community has too few
resources to enforce the competition rules, this article is not practical. The Court could
not distinguish prohibited conduct without using a standard of efficiency. As a result of
200
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using this standard only, the competition rules are used to protect small firms at the
expense of large and efficient firms, rather than to enable efficient firms to expand at the
expense of the less efficient. Consequently, article 86 would not be consistent with the
Community spirit. 207
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SECTON V
THE MERGER REGULATION

1. Introduction
For 16 years after the first draft was proposed in 1973, there was a great debate on
the scope of the Merger Regulation and on the authority of the Commission.208 The
Commission continuously proposed a regulation that would prohibit anti-competitive
mergers and would give the Commission power to control them. However, some of the
member states were hesitant to relinquish their power to control mergers.209 This
hesitation created the abnormally long period to get the agreement signed, and the
significantly decreased scope of turnover. 210
On December 21, 1989, following the request of business and industry, the
Council eventually adopted a regulation211 that requires firms to notify the Commission
about their mergers in advance and provide the Commission with the sole power to
control them.212 With the preemptive power, the Merger Regulation applies to all
industries except coal and steel fields that are governed directly by the Coal and Steel

208

Elland, supra note 4, at 111.

209

Korah, supra note 17, at 262.

210

Id.

211

Council Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L395/1) 4.

212

Griffin, supra note 27, at 15.

38

Treaty.213 In fact, concentrations in the E.U. steel industry fall both under EC regulations
and the ECSC.214
There are several advantages under the new Merger Regulation in 1989. In terms
of legal and administrative costs, firms that need concentrations can benefit under the
regulation because the processing period, as well as the business cost, has decreased.215
Regarding the scope of concentrations, the Merger Regulation is much more favorable
than article 85(1).216 In addition, the analysis of the markets under the regulation has
been more satisfactory than under article 85.217
The Merger Regulation was designed for three major purposes. The first purpose
was to give the Commission the sole authority to control competition-distorting
concentrations that would threaten competition in the Common Market, and thus to end
the debate as to whether the Treaty conferred such authority to the Commission.218
Before the Merger Regulation was first introduced in 1989, every concentration was
debated as to whether it had a Community dimension. If it did, the Commission was
given authority over the concentration.
The second purpose for the Merger Regulation was to provide the Commission
with basic information on how the concentration will be carried out before mergers are
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consummated.219 Following the market analysis based on the information, the
Commission decides whether to stop problematic mergers before their consummation. It
is very difficult to control concentrations after they have been completed. Giving the
Commission a chance to review the mergers in advance can save a lot of time, money,
and effort.
Finally, the third purpose was to grant enforcement power to the Commission on
the Community level so that enterprises may avoid complicated and inconsistent regimes
on the national level.220 Through the one-stop-shop principle, the involved undertakings
need to make only one filing to the Commission rather than multiple filings to each
nation.221 As a result of this principle, the legal and administrative costs and the
processing period are decreased significantly. The most important benefit of this
regulation is that this unified regulation can overcome the inconsistency of the national
competition laws.222

2. Definition of Concentrations
The general expression “merger” has been used to refer to the normal situation
where a bidder acquires control of the target until the term “concentration” was used in
the Merger Regulation.223 The definition of concentrations has been introduced in article
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3 of the Merger Regulation.224 This article covers mergers, acquisitions, and joint
ventures.
The general definition of merger is the combination of several separate companies
or corporations into a single body. Depending on the combination, there are many
different kinds of mergers such as down-stream merger, cash merger, and conglomerate
merger. Acquisition means gaining the assets or the stock of the target company for the
purpose of possessing or controlling the target company wholly or partially. “Control” is
defined as “rights, contracts, or any other means which either separately or jointly …
confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking,” through share
ownership, voting, management agreements, or any other ways of rights operating on the
undertaking.225 There are two kinds of acquisitions, asset acquisition and stock
acquisition.
In fact, about half of the Commission’s decisions under the regulations have
involved joint ventures.226 A joint venture is an association of companies jointly
undertaking some commercial enterprise.227 A joint venture is not exactly the same as a
partnership; rather, it is a legal entity functioning as a “temporary partnership.”228 A joint
venture is also within the definition of concentration only if it is properly described as
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“concentrative,”229 rather than “co-operative.”230 Among two joint ventures, only
concentrative joint ventures are governed directly by the Merger Regulation.231 Because
the Commission had long regarded concentrative joint ventures not to be controlled by
article 85, the Commission put concentrative joint ventures on the regime of the Merger
Regulation.232
Throughout article 3, concentrations are defined to be the act of forming a new
economic entity through mergers, acquisitions, or joint ventures.233 However, not every
concentration is governed by the Merger Regulation. Instead, according to the
regulation, the Commission should intervene only in concentrations having a Community
dimension. 234 When the Commission governs the concentrations with a Community
dimension, the national authorities involved are no longer able to control them because
the Commission has superior power.235
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3. One-Stop-Shop Principle
Before the Merger Regulation, member states had a unique competence of merger
control under national law.236 Even though the member states opposed the extension of
the Commission’s power to the field of merger control, they seemed to be more attracted
to solving the problem of multi-notification under the Merger Regulation.237 The
regulation avoided problems of concurrent application, whether with European law and
with national law, or whether with national laws involved in mergers.238
In the European Community, the Commission is the only organization with
exclusive power that administers and approves concentrations with a Community
dimension under the Merger Regulation.239 Since the Commission has power to assess
whether a concentration is able to comply with the Common Market, undertakings
involved in concentrations with a Community concern file only with the Commission.
Even though a concentration is involved in several member states, the parties of the
concentration are not required to report to each member state involved. Instead, the
Merger Regulation affords companies the opportunity of one filing, rather than multiple
filings.240 This is called the “one-stop-shop principle,”241 which is the uniformity of the
law’s regulation.
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Through the one-stop-shop principle, companies cut their administrative and legal
costs and reduce the uncertainties resulting from various national levels.242 It is very
expensive to furnish information on different forms for several national authorities.243
For these reasons, this regulation has been created under the suggestion and pressure of
the businesses and industries that need to do concentrations.
However, this one-stop-shop principle is applied only to concentrations within the
scope of the regulation. The undertakings which do concentrations with a Community
dimension are released from a duty to notify national authorities about the concentrations
under national law. Most member states have their own competition regulation
controlling mergers, acquisitions, or joint ventures. Regarding concentrations below a
Community dimension, national authorities govern under national laws.244
While the Merger Regulation does not explicitly exclude the possibility of
applying articles 85 and 86 to concentrations, the Commission expressly refused the
applicability of these articles to mergers.245

4. Standard and Objects
Not every merger, acquisition, joint venture or concentration is the object of this
regulation. According to the regulation, only concentrations having a Community
dimension are within the scope of the regulation.246
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Following the intention of the Community legislature, the Commission needs to
control mergers whose operation is of a certain economic size; that is, where the
aggregate amount of the turnover exceeds the threshold of the Community.247 The
regulation is designed to control not a small concentration but a large one that can make a
significant impact on the Common Market.248 Therefore, insignificant concentrations
which do not largely affect competition should be approved without delay.249
The Community dimension is provided in Article 1 of the regulation:250

(2) For the purpose of this Regulation, a concentration has a
Community dimension where:
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 5000 million; and
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two
of the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 250 million,
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than twothirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and
the same Member State.

To have a Community dimension, three tests should be passed: (i) the two-thirds
test, (ii) the worldwide turnover, and (iii) the Community-wide turnover.251
Even though several member states have been involved in a merger, the merger is
regarded as not having a Community dimension if the majority of the transactions of the
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merger are concentrated in a member state where at least one undertaking achieves more
than two thirds of total Community-wide turnover. This is the two-thirds test, and the
Merger Regulation does not apply to concentrations which fail this test. As a result of the
two thirds test, there is a different treatment of concentrations between smaller and larger
member states because the test does not consider the possibility of a different market
share which can significantly impact interstate trade.252
In addition, when the aggregate worldwide and Community-wide turnover
exceeds the thresholds presented in article 1, all concentrations are considered to have a
Community dimension. Undertakings involved in a concentration having a Community
dimension are required to notify the Commission about their concentrations following the
regulation.253
The Commission analyzes mergers within the scope of the regulation. The
Commission’s approach focuses on the compatibility with the Common Market, and the
analysis of dominance.254 The Community competition rule has been created to protect
the Common Market, in terms of not only competition issues, but also social and
industrial policy.255 Through the maintenance and development of effective competition
in the Community, the Community wants to defend the Common Market.256 The
Common Market plays an essential role in achieving the Community’s goals.
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Contrary to what may have been expected, the Merger Regulation in its final form
does not reflect a compromise between two approaches: competition issue and social
policy.257 Instead, the regulation established the standard mostly based on competition
issues, despite several factors suggested in article 2.258 A clear advantage of the
regulation is the reduction of the need to use article 86 in subsequent cases, if the
Commission has been able to prevent the creation or strengthening of companies with
dominant position within the scope of the regulation.259
One of the great objectives of the Community is to improve the standard of living
and expand economic activities.260 To achieve these goals, the Community needs to
establish a common market because throughout the common market, all economic
resources are free to move without the limits of national boundaries.261 However, if there
are some agreements restricting competition, such as strong cartels or monopolies, then
the common market is useless. For this reason, the Community wants to directly control
any agreement or concentrations restricting competition.
The concept of a dominant position is applied much the same in article 86 and in
the Merger Regulation.262 While article 86 deals with the abusive exploitation by
companies which already have a dominant position in their past conduct, the Merger
Regulation focuses on the future consequences of the concentrations, which will create or
257
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strengthen a dominant position. A dominant position in the Merger Regulation is defined
as “a position of market power which enables the entity to act independently of its
competitors, customers and consumers and exists only when market shares exceed 40 per
cent.”263 The concentrations that do not create or strengthen a dominant position are
considered to be compatible with the Common Market.264
The competitive structure of the market is the main concern of the Commission
under the regulation. The regulation allows transactions to change a market structure but
only prohibits negative effects on competitive market structure.265

5. Referral of Concentrations back to Member States
One of the main reasons that member states accepted the Merger Regulation was
the value of the one-stop-shop principle for larger concentrations having both a
substantial world and Community turnover.266 Nevertheless, there are two major
exceptions to the one-stop-shop principle in the regulation: article 9 “Referral to the
competent authorities of the Member States”267 and article 21 “Jurisdiction.”268
Article 9 was designed to respond to some states’ desire to retain authority to
challenge mergers that threatened competition in the states even if the merger had a
Community dimension.269 Satisfying two conditions of article 9, allous member states to
263
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request that the Commission refer a merger to them.270 One condition is that a distinct
market exists within the member state, and the other is that the concentration threatens
effective competition through creating or strengthening a dominant position.271
However, the final decision to refer back is taken by the Commission.272 The
Commission may decide to deal itself with some aspects of the case and refer others back
to the member state which have impact on the distinct market.273 Furthermore, the
Commission still supervises the final outcome of the case. This referral procedure
reflects the necessity for the Commission to show its willingness to co-operate with the
member states.274 Since Tarmac/Steetly,275 there have been a lot of other referrals back to
member states under article 9.
According to article 21, even though the Commission has sole jurisdiction to
govern a concentration with a Community dimension, exceptional jurisdiction is given to
member states. To protect “legitimate interests” such as public security, plurality of the
media, and prudential rules, and any other “public interest,” member states may take
suitable actions other than those taken by the regulation.276 The effect of this provision is
primarily negative because it does not provide any new rights for member states, but
accepts in Community law their power to intervene in certain aspects of concentrations
269
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that affect them on important public interests other than those covered by the Merger
Regulation.277
In Lyonnaise/Northumbrian Water,278 where legislation made mergers between
water enterprises following privatization of the water and sewerage industry in the United
Kingdom, the Commission accepted the request and referred back to the United Kingdom
because the merger was concluded to be against the public interest. Member states could
insist on their jurisdiction in such situations, as newspaper mergers and arsenal company
acquisitions that threaten national security.279
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SECTION VI
THE MERGER REGULATION AMENDMENT

Going into effect March 1, 1998, the provision of Regulation 1310/97280 amended
Regulation 4064/89. The amendments of the regulation were created to resolve the
problems arising from the high thresholds of the regulation.281 Even though a merger
does not attain the primary thresholds of the regulation, it needs to be considered as
having a Community dimension if the merger will significantly impact many member
states. Otherwise, the Merger Regulation no longer serves the original purpose: the
decrease of legal uncertainty and the reduction of merger costs from multiple
notifications of the merger transaction.
Since the original regulation did not cover this small but important concentration
due to excessively high thresholds, the new amending regulation includes the extension
of the scope to smaller-scale mergers.282 To extend the scope of the regulation, the
amendments not only have included cooperative joint ventures but have also decreased
the turnover thresholds in the regulation.283 The basic structures of the old regulation
remain, even though the amendments have extended the regulation scope. These minor
amendments reflect the success of the old regulation.284 The new amendments show a
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trend in interpreting Community competition laws—a more economic approach, rather
than a legal one.285

1. The new thresholds
While the existing turnover thresholds remain in the amending regulation, the
amendments have introduced new thresholds in order to include merger transactions,
which have a crucial cross-border effect, but are not within the scope of the regulation
because of its high thresholds.286 The new turnover threshold was expected to efficiently
serve the purpose of the regulation, but it has turned out to be a meaningless extension.287
Initially, the Commission proposed to substantially lower the worldwide and the
Community-wide threshold, but this proposal was defeated by most member states
because they argued that thresholds had already been lowered in real terms as a result of
inflation.288 In addition, the general growth of businesses and the geographic extension
of the European Union through the acceptance of new member states have made it easier
for companies to satisfy the thresholds.289 However, following the response of the
industry, the Council adopted the amendments.
In article 1 of the amending regulation, the three tests established in the original
regulation still remain, but the scope of the regulation has been extended to include small
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mergers through the introduction of additional, lower turnover thresholds.290 Actually,
the minimum threshold requirements for both the worldwide and the Community-wide
turnover have been decreased from ECU 5 billion to ECU 2.5 billion and from ECU 250
million to ECU 100 million.291 Moreover, the amendments introduced two new
thresholds to cover substantial overall turnover292 and individual turnover.293
The new turnover thresholds are created to help comparatively small undertakings
benefit from the one-stop-shop principle under the regulation. In the amendment of the
regulation, the Commission extended its jurisdiction and the scope of the regulation by
lowering thresholds.294 However, there are several problems with the new thresholds.
Even though the amended regulation has greatly decreased the minimum turnover
requirement, the threshold is still regarded as substantial at the Community level.
Although the new thresholds were created with good intentions, their introduction has
had a negative impact on the undertakings involved.295 The companies involved in a
concentration benefit from the reduction of administrative and legal costs; however, the
benefit comes at the price of a greater regulatory complexity.296 In concentrations
involving many parties across almost the entire Community, more combinations of
turnovers than before may be necessary in order to decide whether the regulation will
290
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apply to the concentration. Since the analysis of the concentrations requires a breakdown
of each party’s Community turnover on a state by state basis, these various combinations
could increase administrative and legal costs for a number of unnecessary transactions
that turn out not to be within the Community’s scope.297 In addition, there is great
potential to miscalculate the new lower thresholds because of the many calculations
based on each member state.298

2. Joint Ventures
The manner of classifying joint ventures differs depending on the statute or the
country. The joint venture in the context of this paper should be interpreted in the
language of the regulation because this definition of joint venture has been developed by
the Commission through the regulation.299 Since the creation of the regulation in 1989,
joint ventures have been classified into two categories: concentrative joint ventures and
co-operative joint ventures.
Before the amendments of the Merger Regulation, the original regulation only
defined concentrative joint ventures.300 To be a concentrative joint venture with a
Community dimension, the joint venture had to satisfy positive and negative
conditions.301 The positive conditions302 were that the parents of the joint venture must
296
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have joint control, that the joint venture must perform all the functions of an autonomous
economic entity, and that it must run its business continuously.303 The positive condition
was also used in the amendment because of its importance. The negative condition was
that there was no co-ordination between parents and the joint venture in the same
market.304 The significance of the negative condition was greatly decreased because the
amendment did not use the negative condition in its definition of joint ventures.305
Since a concentrative joint venture with a Community dimension was within the
scope of the regulation, the joint venture was governed by the Commission. However,
neither the regulation nor article 85 of the Treaty of Rome controlled the concentrative
joint venture which lacks a Community dimension.306 Only national competition law
may be applied to the joint venture.307 Nevertheless, co-operative joint ventures out of
the scope of the Merger Regulation have been subject to article 85 until the amendment
of the Merger Regulation includes co-operative joint ventures within its scope.308 As a
result of the amendment, the only joint ventures subject to article 85 are co-operative
joint ventures, which do not have a Community dimension because of the low aggregate
turnover.309
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Any other joint ventures, which were not categorized as concentrative in the
regulation, were considered to be co-operative.310 That is, when a joint venture had all
the positive conditions above, the joint venture was a co-operative joint venture if the
joint venture would remain in the same market as the parents.311 All co-operative joint
ventures were out of the scope of the regulation; therefore, the joint venture was
automatically not controlled by the regulation. Instead, it was dominated by article 85 of
the Treaty of Rome and national competition regulations.
Before the amendments, the distinction between co-operative and concentrative
joint ventures was critical because each joint venture was governed by a different regime,
either the Merger Regulation or article 85 of the Treaty of Rome.312 In spite of the
difficulty and uncertainty caused by the distinction between the two joint ventures, the
original regulation included in its scope, not a co-operative joint venture, but only a
concentrative one.313 This distinction was made because the majority of concentrations
were concentrative joint ventures when the regulation was established the first time.314
However, as time went by, the Commission recognized the need to control the two joint
ventures under a unified authority in order to resolve such problems as complexity and
uncertainty. The amendment eliminates the negative condition, which was used to define
concentrative joint ventures, to include co-operative joint ventures within the scope of the
regulation; therefore, all full-function joint ventures are covered in the Community scope.
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Before the amendment to the Merger Regulation, it was the only requirement for
concentrative joint ventures to satisfy. After the amendments, however, the regulation
needed to be incorporated with article 85 of the Treaty of Rome.315 That is, full-function
joint ventures should pass not only the dominance test of the regulation but also the
criteria of article 85(1) in order to assess the effect of the joint venture on the
relationships between parents.316
In the past, depending on the “risk of co-ordination” criterion joint ventures were
assessed to be ruled under article 85 of the Treaty or the regulation. As the criterion was
getting restricted, a joint venture was considered co-operative when a high probability of
co-ordination was accepted in an instance such as multiple parents running their business
in the same market with the joint venture.317 Only those joint ventures where two or
more parents operate in the joint venture’s market are controlled by the regulation, as a
result of the amendments.318
Since the amendments were adopted, companies involved in mergers do not try to
make an effort to structure joint ventures as concentrative because the regulation covers
all full-function joint ventures, both concentrative and co-operative. As a result, many
transactions which were regarded as concentrative joint ventures now fall into cooperative joint ventures.
Even though both joint ventures are within the scope of the regulation, there is a
different treatment between concentrative and co-operative joint ventures in relation to
315
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the applicability of regimes.319 All concentrative joint ventures are not out of the scope
of article 85, regardless of the undertakings’ turnover. However, co-operative joint
ventures lacking a Community dimension are still subject to both national competition
regulation and article 85.320
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SECTION VII
APPLICATION OF EC COMPETITION REGULATIONS

While the Community competition regulations initially have been designed to
control concentrations of undertakings whose commercial activities are within the
Community, the application of the regulations is also extended to other countries outside
the Community.321 The Community can only extend its jurisdiction outside the
Community based on international law principles.322 However, since the substantive
competition regulations are not universally agreed upon, it is necessary to examine the
extraterritorial application of the Community competition law.323 The Community
competition law should be understood in the context of world trade, enabling the
treatment of the competition law problems to be carried out on a more global basis.324
In addition, whether the competition law functions efficiently in a new market
involving new technologies in rapidly evolving market will be examined.
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1. Extraterritoriality
Through its historical development, the EC competition policy has been dealing
with its extraterritorial applicability outside the Community under article 85 and 86 of the
Treaty and under the Merger Regulation.325

(i) Under Articles 85 and 86
Article 85 and 86 has affected foreign multinationals which operate in the
Community through subsidiaries or under agreements such as distribution or licensing.
Through their decisions, the Court and the Commission have created the territorial scope
of articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.326 Based on two theories, the “Single Economic
Entity” theory and the “Effects” doctrine, the Court and the Commission assert that their
jurisdiction have been extended to undertakings whose headquarters are located outside
the Community.327
(1) The Single Economic Entity Theory
Through both cases, Dyestuffs328 and Continental Can,329 the Court and the
Commission indicated clearly that the independent personality of a subsidiary, which is
separated legally from its parent company, was not able to preclude the possibility of
imputing the conduct of the subsidiary to the parent.
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In Dyestuffs,330 where ICI, a parent company, gave price instructions to its wholly
owned subsidiary incorporated in Belgium to increase price of dyestuffs, ICI argued that
it was established, located, and operated outside the Community; therefore, the
Commission, which was supposed to govern undertakings within the Community, was
not given the power to control or impose fines on external undertakings merely based on
the effects occurred within the Community. However, the Commission found that with
other companies, ICI was actually engaged in illegal price fixing agreements through
subsidiaries, which were placed within the Community, but were controlled under ICI.331
The Court did not take all arguments of the Commission, except the single
economic entity theory. Based on the theory, the Court went beyond the legal distinction
between parent and subsidiary companies, and decided that ICI limited competition in the
Common Market through the use of power to control subsidiaries within the
Community.332
The Court confirmed again this single economic theory in Continental Can,
stating “simply because a subsidiary had its own legal personality, it did not preclude the
possibility that its conduct might be attributed to the parent company.”333 However, to
apply the single economic entity theory, it should be clarified whether the parent
company actually controls its subsidiary undertaking.334 To decide the relationship
between the parent and the subsidiary company, the Court and the Commission consider
330
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various factors such as the size of shareholding held by the parent, the amount of
representation on the board of the subsidiary, and its influence for the subsidiary’s
commercial activity.335
Both the Dyestuffs336 and Continental Can337 cases show that the subsidiary does
not make a decision independently; but instead, the parent companies control their
subsidiary regardless of their location, nationality, or domicile. Even though both cases’
test can be used in both the “single economic entity theory,” and the “effects” doctrine,
the Court intended to establish the first.338
(2) The Effects Doctrine.
Under the terms of article 85 and 86, if any undertaking within the scope of these
articles have an effect on trade of member states, the undertaking is responsible for any
proceedings brought against it regardless of its nationality, place of incorporation, or
domicile.339 The “effects” doctrine originated in the United States.340 The U.S. courts
have accepted this doctrine since Aluminum Co. of America341 asserting extraterritorial
application of the U.S. antitrust law.342
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To decide whether a transaction satisfies the doctrine, the court proposed a test
containing two conditions: (1) the conduct outside the United States has to “have
substantial effect” within the state’s territory and (2) this conduct has to “be intended.”343
However, the U.S. court has limited the scope of the doctrine by adding a balancing
test,344 which was introduced in Timberlane Lumber Co.345
As far as the Community is concerned, the “effects” doctrine was referred from
dicta in Béguelin Import Co.346 According to the doctrine, the fact that one of the
companies involved in the agreement was located in a non-member country did not
interrupt the applicability of article 85 as long as the agreement affected the competition
in the Common Market. 347 On the contrary, the Commission has not made any decision
based on the “effects” doctrine.348
The Commission’s view has been upheld in Dyestuffs.349 In Dyestuffs, Advocate
General Mayras supported the “effects” doctrine which was, one of arguments made by
the Commission.350 He conceded that the jurisdiction of the EC competition law can be
extended outside the Community based on the doctrine.351 He established three pre343
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conditions before applying the effects test: (1) the agreement must restrict “directly and
immediately” the competition in the Common Market, (2) the effect of the performance
must be “reasonably foreseeable,” and (3) the effect resulted from the conduct must be
“substantial.”352
In Wood Pulp,353 the Court finally agreed with the Commission to the “effects”
doctrine, and found that all wood pulp producers infringed article 85 even though all of
their headquarters were outside the Community. Nevertheless, the Court did not fully
approve the doctrine, and concluded that its decisions did not rely on the “effects”
doctrine. Instead, the Court considered the place where the agreement was implemented
as a decisive factor.354
In the light of the discussion above, a combination of both the “effects” and
“single economic entity” has been appeared in several cases.355 However, the Court has
seemed to support a single economic entity theory, rather than the effects doctrine356
because in most cases, the Court resolved cases based on not the latter but the former.357

(ii) Under the Merger Regulation
Under article 85 and 86, the legal basis for exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
remains unclear, the Commission made it clear that its jurisdiction of competition
352

Id.

353

Ahlström & Others, Case C-89, [1988] E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901.

354

The Court stated that “an infringement of article 85 … consists of conduct made up of two elements, the
formation of the agreement, decision or concerted practice, and the implementation thereof.”
355

D.G.G. Lange and J.B. Sandage, The Wood Pulp Decision and Its Implications for the Scope of E.C.
Competition Law, 16 C.M.L. REV. 137, (1989).
356

Fine, supra note 338, at 97.

64

regulations outside the Community is justified under the Merger Regulation.358 The
Merger Regulation has two aspects that clarify its jurisdiction outside the Community:
notification to the Commission and remedy of negative effect of concentrations.359
The Merger Regulation implicated that concentrations having a Community
dimension are within the scope of the regulation regardless of the nationality or country
of undertakings involved in the concentrations.360 Therefore, extraterritorial operations
within the scope must notify to the Commission.361 As a standard to decide whether a
transaction has a Community dimension, the regulation provides for the worldwide
turnover and the Community-wide turnover.362 This standard has targeted undertakings
that perform a very large proportion of their activities outside the Community.
According to article 2 of the Merger Regulation, the Commission is empowered
to control concentrations that create or strengthen a dominant position in the Common
Market or a substantial part of it.363 This implies that the Commission may take
substantive actions to even undertakings whose headquarters and main operations are
outside the Community, for the purpose of remedying anti-competitive effects of the
concentrations of such undertakings. However, the Commission has limited its right to
apply its competition rules only to the concentrations within the Community.364
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(iii) Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Case
Under the Merger Regulation, undertakings that have minimal or no assets within
the Community are also liable to Community jurisdiction, for concentrations which have
the potential to enter the Common Market.365 The regulation also applies to particular
transactions which have no effect on the Community.366 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
represents this situation.367
During the period between 1987 to 1996 the aerospace industry consisted of three
main players: Boeing, Airbus, and McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC). Their
average market share was 61%, 27%, and 12% respectfully.368 In 1996, Boeing and
MDC entered into an agreement by which MDC would be a subsidiary of Boeing;
therefore, this merger created the world’s largest aerospace company, whose value was
$14 billion and whose world market share was over 70% of commercial jet aircraft.369
While the U.S. Federal Trade Commission approved the merger, the Commission
was against it because the proposed concentration would strengthen Boeing’s already
dominant position.370 The Commission worried that the dominant position would
significantly alter effective competition in the common market. In fact, Boeing’s
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dominance was demonstrated in 20-year exclusive supplier agreements with Continental,
Delta, and American Airlines.371
To remove the potential competition concerns of the Commission, Boeing offered
the Commission several undertakings as an alternative.372 As a result of these
concessions, the Commission approved the merger with a belief that Boeing’s
undertakings were sufficient to offset the negative effects the merger might have on the
Community.373 Through the Boeing/MDC merger, the Commission confirmed that it has
the right to control even an all-American merger when it is likely to affect the Common
Market.
Regarding the Boeing/MDC merger, both the U.S. and the EC had apparently
different views on the effectiveness of the conditions offered by Boeing.374 However, it
is shown that the territoriality of the Merger Regulation has been based on the “effects”
doctrine.375 Also, through the merger, the Commission was shown to be empowered to
govern even overseas concentrations which have direct, substantial, and foreseeable
effects on the Common Market. In terms of extraterritoriality, the Merger Regulation
gives the Commission jurisdiction to control mergers outside the Community, which have
the potential to create or strengthen a dominant position within the Community.376

371

THE TIMES, July 22, 1997, at 26.

372

Antonio F. Bavasso, Boeing/McDonnel Douglas: Did the Commission Fly Too High, 19(4) EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 243, 246 (1998).
373

Supra note 368, at N63.

374

Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, Case IV/M.877, OJ [1997] C336/16.

375

JONES AND GONZALES-DIAZ, THE MERGER REGULATION, 88-91 (1992).

376

Id.

67

2. New Market
In the fast-moving world of the “new economy” mergers and joint ventures have
become a potent means for companies to develop new products and services ahead of
competitors. By their very nature, such innovation-led transactions are likely to give the
merged company a competitive advantage.377 Two recent cases—Vodafone
Airtouch/Mannesmann and Microsoft/Liberty Media/Telewest—illustrate the difficult
judgment which needs to be made in applying merger control to markets of this kind.378
In the Vodafone/Mannesmann merger,379 the Commission recognized that as a
result of the merger, the undertakings would benefit only for a short period from early
leadership that has been produced by the innovation of mobile technology. Nevertheless,
the Commission argued that the new service of Vodafone/Mannesmann composed a
separate market, and concluded that as an only supplier in the market, the company has a
dominant position.380 The Commission is unlikely to allow mergers that establish even a
temporary market power in a new market. In light of a market economy, it is
unreasonable to consider such a transitory advantage a dominant position because the
limit of profit opportunities for a transitory period reduces the incentive for investment or
innovation.381
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SECTION VIII
CONCLUSION

Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome were the major competition regulations
at the Community level before the Merger Regulation was set up in 1989. It was
necessary that the Commission have a unified central power to deal with mergers at the
Community level, but under articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, the Commission could not
prevent mergers creating a dominant position. Instead, it could govern only mergers
which strengthened the company’s dominant position.382 However, the Commission
lacked adequate power to control anti-competitive mergers in advance. Even though the
Commission intervened informally after 1973 in several large mergers through
prevention or modification of their transactions, the Commission did not take formal
action.383
Following the need for of structured competition law at the Community level, the
Merger Regulation was created in 1989. Since then, the regulation has proven to be a
success in controlling concentrations within its scope, in advance.384 Through the fast
procedure and the one-stop-shop principle, the Commission satisfied businesses and
industries even though there were structurally some problematic provisions, such as
extensively high thresholds, and the distinction between concentrative and co-operative
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joint ventures.385 Those unsatisfactory propositions prevented the regulation from
serving its goals. To solve these problems, the Commission proposed amendments with
support from businesses.386
The amendments to the original regulation seem to extend the scope of the
regulation significantly, and to reflect its success against control of national competition
law and of article 85. However, the additional number of mergers falling into the
regulation as a result of the amendments has been less than expected.387 In addition, the
complicated amending regulation has reduced the benefit of the administrative and legal
costs saving from the change.388
It is difficult to estimate how many additional cases fall under the scope of the
amended regulation because of the new definition of concentrations, which includes cooperative joint ventures.389 Even though the new assessment of joint ventures does not
greatly improve the analysis of the regulation, companies benefit from the efficient
procedure and the fast process under the amended regulation. Also, the amendments
bring a negative effect through the analysis of article 85 because the analysis of the
regulation conflicts somewhat with that of article 85.390 Companies can benefit from the
new joint venture analysis when the article 85 criterion is interpreted appropriately.
Unless the interpretation is acceptable, the potential problem of the article 85 analysis
comes at the cost of other procedural benefits.
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The EC merger regulations seem to have been well developed since articles 85
and 86 through the amendments to the regulation. From a theoretical point of view, the
Community competition laws have tried to eliminate inconsistencies caused by different
national competition regulations between member states. However, the closer the
Community comes to reaching its goals through unification of competition regulations in
the Common Market, the more the inconsistencies increase between the Community and
the rest of the world.391
Today, the world is becoming globalizes, and the number of countries that have
adopted competition laws have increased. Multiple enforcement authorities around the
world review single transactions involving several countries whose authorities are
different. To facilitate the process of controlling mergers within the framework of the
Community, it is necessary for the various authorities to review the transaction with a
consistent standard. Otherwise, mergers that have been successfully approved by the
Community authority might still conflict with the authority of countries outside the
Community.
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